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I. INTRODUCTION
In what is often described as the most economically depressed economy the
United States has experienced since the Great Depression, personal and
corporate bankruptcy filings are at near historic highs.' In 2008, Chapter 11
bankruptcy filings, a chapter generally tailored to business debtors,2 grew sixty
percent to 10,160 filings, up from 6,353 filings in 2007.3 Such a dramatic
increase in the rate of Chapter 11 filings has given rise to concern among
creditors and others who have a business relationship with a debtor in Chapter
11 bankruptcy. Among those who have concerns are licensors of intellectual
property. This Note will focus on a primary concern of these non-debtor
licensors: how the court determines whether a debtor in Chapter 11 bankruptcy
who holds an intellectual property license is permitted to assume that license as
a debtor-in-possession, over the objections of the licensor.
Imagine, for example, that a corporation holds a license to market exercise
related products and services bearing the TaeBo trademark, a mark associated
with a particular type of physical fitness regimen and owned by a party other
than the license holder.4 When the licensee corporation files for Chapter 11
bankruptcy, it becomes a debtor-in-possession and proposes as part of its
reorganization plan to assume the license it held (prior to filing for bankruptcy)
to market these TaeBo-marked products. The owner of the mark refuses to
give consent to the assumption of the license. Without the license, the debtorin-possession faces an almost certain failed attempt at reorganization under
Chapter 11.
At present, the outcome of such a situation may well depend upon the
jurisdiction in which the bankruptcy case is filed. In determining whether a
debtor-in-possession licensee may assume a license to intellectual property over
the objections of the licensor, courts have looked to the language of 11 U.S.C.
5 365(c), 5 a provision of the Bankruptcy Code addressing executory contracts.6
There is division among the courts with regard to the interpretation of the

1 Press Release, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Up In
Calendar Year 2008 (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/News View/0903-05/BankruptcyFilings-upinCalendarYear-2008.aspx.
2 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 1100.01 (15th ed. 2004).
3 Press Release, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, supra note 1.
4 See N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 279 Fed. Appx. 561 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009).
s See, e.g., John R. Knapp, Jr., Treatment of IntellectualProperty Ijcenses in Bankrupty, ADVOCATE,
Aug.-Sept. 2007, at 29; Brett T. Cooke, Intellectual Propery Licenses and Assignments Under Chapter 11
of the Bankrupty Code: A Brief Suney of the Nature of Propery Rights Conferred and Impkcations Due to
Reorganiation, 15 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 213, 218-27 (2007) (discussing property rights arising
under executory contracts).
6 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2006).
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ambiguous language of Section 365(c). 7 The division primarily concerns
whether and under what conditions a debtor-licensee may assume or assign an
intellectual property license.8 Depending on the jurisdiction where the debtor
has filed for bankruptcy protection, the court may administer one of two
tests-the so-called "hypothetical test" or the "actual test."9 The "hypothetical
test" provides that a debtor-licensee may not assume an intellectual property
license where applicable non-bankruptcy law would otherwise prohibit
assignment without the consent of the licensor. 0 This holds true even when
the debtor-in-possession indicates no interest in assigning the license. Under
this test, if the debtor-licensee "lacks hypothetical authority to assign a contract,
then it may not assume it-even if the debtor-in-possession has no actual
intention of assigning the contract to another."" The "hypothetical test" has
been adopted by the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.12
Alternatively, under the "actual test" approach, the court permits a debtorlicensee to assume an intellectual property license over the objections of the
licensor where the debtor seeks only to assume the intellectual property license
and has not contemplated assignment to a third party.13 The "actual test" is
used by the First and Fifth Circuits, as well as by lower courts in the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits.14
This split of authority was recently left unresolved when the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari in N.CP. Markeing Group, Inc. v. BG Star
Productions,Inc. (N.CP. Markeing).Ss In this case, discussed in greater detail later
in this Note, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada relied
on the Ninth Circuit's prior interpretation of the language of 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(c)(1) in relation to copyrights and patents, and extended this
interpretation to trademarks.16 This interpretation provided that copyrights,
patents, and now trademarks, "are personal and assignable only with the
consent of the licensor and therefore unassumable under section 365(c)(1)."17
7 Neil S. Hirshman, Michael G. Fatall & Peter M. Spingola, Is Silence Really Golden? Assumption
andAssignment of IntellectualPropery Licenses in Bankrupty, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 197, 212-15 (2007).
8 Cooke, supra note 5, at 223; Hirshman, Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7, at 198.
9 Knapp, supra note 5, at 29; Hirshman, Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7, at 213-14.
10 Hirschman, Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7, at 213.
" N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., 279 Fed. Appx. 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 1577, 1577 (2009).
12 Supreme Court Ieaves Circuits Splt on Whether Intellectual Properly Licenses Can Be Assumed in
Bankrpty, CLIENT ALERT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING PRACTICE

GROUPS (King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA) Apr. 1, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.kslaw.com/
library/publication/ca040109.pdf [hereinafter King & Spalding].
13 Hirshman, Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7, at 213-14.
14 King & Spalding, supra note 12, at 2.
15 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009).
16 N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. Blanks (In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group), 337 B.R. 230, 235-37 (D. Nev.
2005).
17 Id at 235.
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Under the "hypothetical test" adopted by the Ninth Circuit, a debtor-inpossession may assume an executory contract only if it might hypothetically,
under applicable non-bankruptcy law, assign that contract to a third party.18
The District Court held that trademark licenses are "personal and nonassignable without the consent of the licensor."' 9 The court further held that
the trademark license at issue was unassumable by the debtor-in-possession
without the consent of the non-debtor licensor. 20 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed this decision. 21
The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari in the case
on March 23, 2009.22 justice Kennedy, with Justice Breyer joining, issued a
statement regarding the denial of certiorari. 23 In tis statement, Justice
Kennedy noted that the "hypothetical test is not . . . without its detractors." 24
Describing a myriad of problems associated with both the "hypothetical" and
"actual tests," Justice Kennedy concluded by noting that "[t]he division in the
courts over the meaning of § 365(c)(1) is an important one to resolve" 25 and
urged the Court to "[i]n a different case ... consider granting certiorari on this
significant question." 26
N.C.P. Marketing may have fared differently in this case were it located in
the First or Fifth Circuit, where the "actual test" provides that a debtor-licensee
may assume an intellectual property license over the objections of the licensor
when the debtor-licensee does not intend to assign the license to a third party. 27
As a result of this continuing circuit split, the disposition of cases involving the
treatment of intellectual property licenses in bankruptcy is largely determined by
the jurisdiction where the bankruptcy petition is filed.
This Note examines the split in authority regarding the treatment of
intellectual property licenses by individuals and corporations seeking Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. This examination centers largely on the underlying,
often competing, policy considerations and principles of intellectual property
law and bankruptcy law. This Note concludes that the "actual test" is the
superior doctrinal test for the advancement and promotion of the underlying
principles of both intellectual property and bankruptcy law. Part II provides a
general overview of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, including relevant statutes, the
purpose of the Chapter 11 protection, and the simple mechanics of a Chapter
18Id. at 234-35.
19 Id. at 237.
20

Id

N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. BG Star Prods., 279 Fed. Appx. 561 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 1577 (2009).
21

Id
23 Id.
24 Id
25 Id. at 1578.
26 Id. at 1577.
27 See Hirshman, Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7, at 213.
22
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11 bankruptcy filing. Part III provides an analysis of the two tests employed by
the courts to determine whether a debtor-in-possession may assume an
intellectual property license over the objections of the non-debtor licensor.
Included in this analysis are cases to illustrate the application of the tests,
elements of the tests, and relevant interpretations of the statutory language to
justify a particular approach. Shortcomings of both the "hypothetical" and the
"actual" tests are highlighted. The pragmatic consequences of the circuit split
are further detailed, including the potential for forum-shopping, differential
protection, effects on lending and capital, and inefficiencies and related legal
costs. Significant attention is given to the underlying policy considerations of
both intellectual property law and bankruptcy law, demonstrating that principles
of both areas of law may be best satisfied through uniform adoption of the
"actual test" in the determination of intellectual property license assumption
and assignment. Finally, Part IV summarizes the effect of the split of authority
at this intersection of bankruptcy and intellectual property law and presents the
reasons why the court should settle this question.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY: AN OVERVIEW
The institution of bankruptcy protection has a long and rich history in the
United States. Indeed, the power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States" is one of the enumerated powers of
Congress included in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United
States. 28 On the inclusion of the bankruptcy clause in the Constitution, James
Madison wrote:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so
intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will
prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie
or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems
29
not likely to be drawn into question.
From its establishment, debtor protection through the formal institution of
bankruptcy, codified under Title 11 of the United States Code and commonly
known as the "Bankruptcy Code," 30 has embodied the principle that commerce
in general, from the perspective of not only the debtor but also creditors, is
better served by permitting debtors occasional and regulated debt relief than by
permitting individuals and businesses to fail.
28 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
29 JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (tan Shapiro ed., 2009).
- 11 U.S.C. %§ 101-1532 (2006).
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The Bankruptcy Code is organized into various chapters, including six
chapters under which a debtor may file bankruptcy.3' These chapters address
the particular needs of certain classes of debtors and provide a range of
statutory relief options. Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, the
chapter this Note addresses, provides businesses, and some individuals, the
opportunity to reorganize and restructure debts, or to engage in a process of
managed liquidation of property. 32 Chapter 11 is grounded in the principle that
business survival, that is, continued operation and productivity, through
reorganization is generally preferable to the forced liquidation of a failed
business' assets for the benefit of its creditors.33 Chapter 11 provides wide
debtor protection under the assumption that "greater value may be derived
from the debtor's assets when coordinated as an operating synergistic business
than would result from piecemeal liquidation." 34 Simply put, a creditor to a
debtor in Chapter 11 bankruptcy should generally fare better by recovering
more of that which is owed to them under the debtor's reorganization plan than
they would have if the debtor had simply ceased operation of its business.
Toward this end of "synergistic business" 35 operation, an estate is
automatically created under 11 U.S.C. 5 541 upon the commencement of a
bankruptcy case. 36 The purpose of this estate is to "allow for the effective
management of the debtor's assets."37 In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the estate is
most often managed by the debtor as the debtor-in-possession, but may
alternatively be managed by a trustee should the court find it necessary to
appoint one. 38 The debtor-in-possession or trustee, as fiduciary, is charged with
protecting the property of the estate.39 Toward this end, the debtor-inpossession or trustee is empowered to sell or lease non-cash-collateral
property,40 and to assume or reject executory contracts. 41
B. AUTOMATIC STAY

Upon commencement of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, an automatic stay is
imposed on all actions by creditors to collect pre-petition claims from the
debtor or to seize or otherwise interfere with property of the estate. 42 There are

31

Id. § 103.

32 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
33

7 id

3

Cooke, supra note 5, at 217.

1100.01 (15th ed. 2004).

35 See id.
36 11 U.S.C.

§ 541 (2006).
Cooke, supra note 5, at 216.
38 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006).
39 Id 1107.
37

40 Id.
41
42

363(b)-(c).
Id. § 365.
Id. 362.
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exceptions to the universe of actions covered by the automatic stay43 and some
creditors are, additionally, able to petition the court for relief from stay.44 The
court may grant relief from stay either "for cause, including the lack of adequate
protection of an interest in property of such party in interest." 45 Relief may
further be granted when the court determines that the debtor has no equity in
the property at issue46 or that the property is "not necessary to an effective
reorganization." 47 There are additional grounds for granting relief from stay
with regard to real property. 48 If the court does not grant relief from the
automatic stay while the bankruptcy is pending, the stay generally continues
until the property ceases to be property of the estate, 49 the case is closed,50 the
case is dismissed,51 or discharge is either granted or denied.52
The automatic stay provisions and other protections of the Bankruptcy
Code are provided to allow debtors the opportunity to formulate a plan for
reorganization "that will enable the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy as a
viable, profitable enterprise."53 Once this plan for reorganization has been
developed, it is submitted to creditors and equity holders of the debtor, who
must vote to accept or reject the plan. 54 The plan is then forwarded to the
court for confirmation55 and, once and if confirmed, implemented by the
debtor and any other entity organized for the purpose of carrying out the plan. 56
C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY

A central element of Chapter 11 bankruptcy is the presumptive right of the
Property of the
individual debtor to retain its pre-petition property.57
bankruptcy estate may include property inherent in an object or thing, such as
real property and patents, or property arising from executory contracts, such as
licenses and leases.58 Of particular relevance to this Note is property in the

43 See id. § 362(b).

4 Id 362(d).
45 Id § 362(d)(1).
4 Id. 362(d)(2)(A).
47 Id. 362(d)(2)(B).
48 Id. 362(d)(3)-(4).
49 Id. 362(c)(1).
0 Id. 362(c)(2)(A).
5 Id § 362(c)(2)(B).
52 Id. 362(c)(2)(C).
s3 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977); 7 COLLIER ON

BANKRUPTCY

1100.09 (15th ed. 2004).

11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006).
5s Id.
1129.
56 Id. 1142.
57 Id. 541. See also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY
1115.01 (15th ed. 2004) (noting the
significant advantage the right to remain in possession of the property of the estate affords to a
Chapter 11 individual debtor over the individual Chapter 7 debtor).
58 Cooke, supra note 5, at 216.
-
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form of intellectual property licenses held by the Chapter 11 debtor. Within the
Bankruptcy Code, intellectual property is defined as follows:
The term "intellectual property" means - (A) trade secret; (B)
invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35; (C)
patent application; (D) plant variety; (E) work of authorship
protected under title 17; or (F) mask work protected under chapter
9 of title 17; to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy
law.59
A debtor's intellectual property rights are generally treated like other
property of the estate, subject, inter alia, to the use, sale, and lease provisions of
11 U.S.C. § 363 to the extent permitted under relevant nonbankruptcy law. 60 A
more complicated issue arises when the debtor in Chapter 11 bankruptcy enters
bankruptcy protection as a licensee of intellectual property.
D. LICENSES

Most courts have treated non-exclusive licenses of intellectual property as
executory contracts. 61 Non-exclusive licenses grant personal, as opposed to
property interests, and do not preclude the licensing of the same product or
property to third parties. 62 In general, non-exclusive licenses of intellectual
property are treated as executory contracts, but exclusive licenses of intellectual
property are not.63 Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the treatment
of all executory contracts in bankruptcy. 64 Though "executory contract" is not
defined in the Code, it is generally held to denote a contract that, "at the time of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition is 'so far unperformed that the failure of
either [party] to complete performance would constitute a material breach
excusing the performance of the other.' "65 Section 365 permits the debtor or
trustee, "subject to the court's approval," to "assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." 66 The primary purpose of extending
such power to the debtor is to "relieve the [debtor] of burdensome obligations
while at the same time providing 'a means whereby a debtor can force others to
continue to do business with it when the bankruptcy filing might otherwise

5 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2006).
6 Id 5 363. See also Cooke, supra note 5, at 217-18.
61 Hirshman, Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7, at 211.
62 In re Golden Books Family Entm't, Inc., 269 B.R. 300, 309-10 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).
63 Id. at 310.
6 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006).
65 Cooke, supra note 5, at 218 (quoting Ven Countryman, ExecutoU Contractsin Bankruptgy: Part
I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 436, 460 (1973)).
* 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006).
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make them reluctant to do so." 67 That is, if the executory contract to which the
debtor is a party provides revenue and reputation to the debtor, other parties
are likely to feel greater confidence in a decision to conduct business with the
debtor. This improved good will may well lead to the debtor's effective
reorganization and continued survival, if not its eventual success.
If an executory contract is in default and a debtor-in-possession or trustee
wishes to assume the contract, certain criteria must be met. The trustee must
cure all defaults in the contract, 68 provide compensation or assurance of
compensation for actual pecuniary loss resulting from any default, 69 and provide
"adequate assurance of future performance under" the contract. 70 Assumption
of the executory contract binds the debtor-in-possession to the terms of that
contract as that debtor moves forward out of bankruptcy.71 Alternatively,
assignment of the executory contract absolves the debtor-in-possession of
future obligations under the contract in the creation of a new contract between
the non-debtor party and a third-party assignee. 72 A debtor-in-possession or
trustee may assign an executory contract of the debtor if in the contract it is
assumed in accordance with the requirements of Section 365(b) 73 and "adequate
assurance of future performance by the assignee is provided." 74 Finally, the
trustee may, subject to the court's approval, reject the executory contract all
together.75 "Rejection" is not specifically defined by the Bankruptcy Code, but
is considered to simply mean "a bankruptcy estate's decision not to assume [the
contract], because the contract or lease does not represent a favorable or
appropriate investment of the estate's resources."76
E. ASSIGNMENT, ASSUMPTION, AND REJECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LICENSES

While Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code generally furthers the debtorfriendly principles underlying Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in permitting
the debtor to absolve itself of burdensome contractual obligations and to
assume those of value, subsections 365(c), 365(e), and 365(n) reflect a deference

67 Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1993)
(quoting Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam)).
68 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (2006).
69 Id. § 365(b)(1)(B).
70 Id. S 365(b)(1)(C).
71 Knapp, supra note 5, at 29.
72 Id
73 11 U.S.C. § 365(f0(2)(A) (2006).
74 Id. § 365(f(2)(B).
75 Id. § 365(a).
76 Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankrupty: Understanding 'Ryection," 59 U. COLO. L.
REv. 845, 848 (1998).
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to the principles that underlie intellectual property law.7 7 Section 365(n), added
to the Bankruptcy Code by the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act
of 1988,78 provides a non-debtor licensee of intellectual property certain
protections in the event that the trustee rejects an executory contract in which
the debtor is the licensor of the intellectual property.79
In the alternative scenario, and the focus of this Note, in which the debtor is
the licensee of intellectual property, Section 365(c) is controlling. Section 365(c)
provides, in relevant part, the following:
The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease
prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such
contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in
possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and (B) such
party does not consent to such assumption or assignment ... .80
It is the interpretation of this statutory language that has lead to the circuit split
and the development of competing tests that are the focus of this Note.
Courts have employed two primary and competing tests to determine
whether an intellectual property license, as an executory contract, may be
the so-called
assumed under the statutory language of Section 365(c):
8
test" is the
"hypothetical
The
1
test."
"actual
and
the
"hypothetical test"
Circuit
Eleventh
and
Ninth,
Third,
majority test, employed most notably by the
83
82
Courts of Appeals, and to some extent by the Fourth Circuit. The "actual

77 Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and Dot-Com Bankruptdes:
Assumption, Assignment and Rejecton of Executory Contracts, Including IntellectualPropertjAgreements, and
Related Issues Under Sections 365(c), 365(e), and 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 307, 314 (2000).
Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (1988) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 5 365(n)).
11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006).
- Id. § 365(c).
81 Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 77, at 331-33; Hirshman, Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7,
at 2 12.
82 Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 77, at 331. See, e.g., Perlman v. Catapult Entrn't, Inc., 165
F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999); City of Jamestown v. James Cable Partners, L.P., 27 F.3d 534 (11th Cir.
1994); In re West Elecs., Inc., 852 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1988).
83 See, e.g., Breeden v. Carron (In r Carron), 158 B.R. 629 (E.D. Va. 1993), af'd per cunam, 25
F.3d 1038 (4th Cir. 1994); RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257
78
79

(4th Cir. 2004).
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test" is the minority test, and is employed primarily by the United States District
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.84
F. "HYPOTHETICAL TEST"

1. Elements of the Test. The majority of courts interpret the ambiguous
language of Section 365(c) to provide that a debtor-licensee may not assume an
intellectual property license where applicable nonbankruptcy law, here
copyright, patent, and trademark law, prohibits assignment of a license without
the consent of the licensor, regardless of the intentions of the debtor to ever
assign the license.85 Under the "hypothetical test," the court creates a
hypothetical third party for the purposes of the analysis. 86 If the licensor of the
intellectual property could lawfully refuse assignment to this hypothetical third
party under nonbankruptcy law, the debtor-licensee is not only barred from
assigning the license without the licensor's consent, but is also prohibited from
assuming (retaining) the license.87 The contract is, thus, effectively terminated,
even when the debtor-licensee has no intention of assigning the contract in
question to a third party.
Beyond the general use or positive treatment of the "hypothetical test" by
the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Fourth Circuit has gone so far as to
hold that a non-exclusive intellectual property license (copyright) that expressly
permitted assignment under certain conditions was not assumable without the
licensor's express consent.88
2. Polig Considerations and Objectives. Courts employing the "hypothetical
test" interpret the statutory language of Section 365(c) by its "plain meaning."89
In doing so, the subscribing courts:
[D]isdain to construe the "or" to mean "and" in the phrase "assume
or assign," and they apply the language "assume or assign" literally
as it is written, reasoning that if the statute as written produces
results which seem at odds with the basic objectives of the
Bankruptcy Code, the remedy lies with Congress, not the courts. 90
The "hypothetical test" approach thus embodies both a plain meaning statutory
interpretation rule as well as deference to Congress.
8 Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 77, at 332; Hirshman, Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7, at
213. See, e.g., Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997).
85 Hirshman, Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7, at 213.
86 Id.
87 Primoff & Weisenberger, supra note 77, at 331; Hirshman, Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7, at
213.
88 In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2004).
89 In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 570 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
90
Id.
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Beyond concern for the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code, courts using
the hypothetical approach also emphasize intellectual property law values.
These courts are particularly concerned that licensors of intellectual property
maintain a significant level of control over their property, and that the system
by which invention and creation are incentivized is not undermined by any
threat to this control.9'
3. Application: Harris v. Emus Records. In Hamis v. Emus Records Cop., 92
singer and songwriter Emmylou Harris (Harris) entered into an agreement with
the Jay-Gee Record Company (Jay-Gee) in which she agreed to record songs
for the company in exchange for certain royalties. 93 Under this agreement,
Harris recorded six songs that were produced as an album entitled "Gliding
Bird" and released by Jay-Gee in 1968.94 Of the six songs on the album, five
were written and composed by Harris and one, the title track, was composed by
96
A
a third party, Tommy Slocum. 95 In 1971, Jay-Gee filed for bankruptcy.
year later, the trustee in the Jay-Gee bankruptcy case sold assets of the debtor,
including the master tape of the original songs included on the Gliding Bird
album. 97 The songs were sold to Suellen Productions, Inc., which subsequently
transferred its rights to produce and distribute the songs and album to Emus
Recordings (Emus).98 Emus re-released the Gliding Bird album in 1979, albeit
with a different cover and serial number.9 9
Because Harris had never received royalties for the re-released Gliding Bird
album, she demanded that Emus cease the manufacture and distribution of the
songs. Harris also sued for copyright infringement. Harris prevailed on her
infringement claim in district court and Emus was enjoined from further
distribution of the Gliding Bird album.'oo In affirming this decision, the United
States Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit held, as a matter of first
0
impression, copyright licenses to be non-transferable as a matter of law.' '
02
Citing similar policy concerns as those later articulated in In re CFLC, Inc.,1
the Court looked to the legislative history of the Copyright Act, concluding:
91 See, e.g., Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that the free assignability of nonexclusive patent licenses would "undermine the
reward that encourages invention"); Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir.
1984) (noting the "awareness" in the legislative history of federal copyright law of "the necessity
of preserving the rights of authors and composers in order to stimulate creativity").
92 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984).
93 Id. at 1331.
94 Id
9s Id
96 Id. at 1332.

97 Id
98 Id.
99 Id
100 Id
101 Id. at 1333.

102Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673 (1996).
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The legislative history reveals an acute awareness of the need to
delicately balance competing interests. On the one hand, there was a
strong reluctance to allow a monopolization of works or
compositions; at the same time, there was an awareness of the
necessity of preserving the rights of authors and composers in order
to stimulate creativity.103
The Court further concluded that, in assignment by a licensee rather than
licensing by the copyright owner, the ability of the copyright owner to monitor
use and collect royalties is undermined.104
4. Application: Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. In 1996, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak
Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), held that because Section 365(c) barred the debtorlicensee from assigning a patent license, the debtor-licensee was also barred
from assuming the license in bankruptcy. 0 5 In this case, Cadtrak Corporation
held a patent for a certain computer graphics technology. In 1986, and again in
1989 as a supplemental agreement, Cadtrak entered into a license agreement
with CFLC (to become Everex Systems, Inc.), a personal computer company.
CFLC received a royalty-free, worldwide, non-exclusive license related to the
patent and, in exchange, Cadtrak received a one-time $290,000 payment.106 The
terms of the license agreement specifically provided that the license was nontransferable, that CFLC did not retain the right to sublicense the property, and
that the license agreement could be terminated upon CFLC's bankruptcy. 07
CFLC subsequently filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in January
1993.108 After liquidating most of its divisions, CFLC sold its remaining assets,
including the opportunity, with court approval, to assume and assign certain
executory contracts to Everex Systems, Inc. (Everex) in November 1993 for
approximately $4 million. 09 Among these contracts was the license agreement
with Cadtrak.11 0 In January 1994, CFLC sought to assume and assign various
executory contracts, including the Cadtrak license, prompting an objection by
Cadtrak. The bankruptcy court denied the assumption and assignment. Everex
and CFLC appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's
denial."'

103 Harris,734 F.2d at 1334 (citing H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909)).
104

Id

105 89 F.3d 673, 673 (1996).
106 Id. at 674.
107 Id. at 674--75.
108 Id. at 675.

Id.
Id
111 Id
109
110
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On appeal the Court of Appeals held that a "nonexclusive patent license is
personal and nondelegable"ll 2 under federal patent law, and that Section 365(c)
3
specifically barred the assumption and assignment of the CFLC license." The
In re CFLC Inc. decision is particularly notable in its conclusion that "federal
law governs the assignability of patent licenses because of the conflict between
14
federal patent policy and state laws ... that would allow assignability."1
Though the Bankruptcy Code generally allows for the assignment of an
executory contract even when that contract contains a "no-assign" provision, as
here, the non-bankruptcy law that would prevent such an assignment of a
patent license is the "longstanding rule of federal common law [that] bars
5
assignment unless the license says otherwise.""
The Court warned of the dangers of allowing states to permit the free
assignability of non-exclusive patent licenses, stating that to do so "would
undermine the reward that encourages invention because a party seeking to use
the patented invention could either seek a license from the patent holder or seek
6
The court
an assignment of an existing patent license from a licensee.""
warned that under such a scenario, the licensees of a patent license become
competitors to the licensor, and that the licensor loses its ability to control the
"identity of its licensees."" 7
G. "ACTUAL TEST"

1. Elements of the Test. Under the "actual test" employed by a minority of
circuit courts, but by a majority of lower courts," 8 the relevant question when
determining whether a license is assignable is not whether relevant
nonbankruptcy law would prohibit the assignment of such a license to a
hypothetical third party, as it is under the "hypothetical test," but whether an
assignment would actually occur, causing the licensor to accept performance
from a third party." 9 Under this actual approach, courts permit a debtorlicensee to assume an intellectual property license when that debtor does not
contemplate assignment to a third party, even in those circumstances in which
the licensor objects to such assumption.120 In contrast to the "hypothetical
112 Id. at 677.

"1 Id. at 679-80.
114 Id. at 679.
115 Matt Siegel, Why the Ninth Circuit Decided Everex as if Evey Patent Licensee in Amenca Were
DestinedforBankrupty, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 423 (2005).
116 Everex Systems v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (1996) (emphasis in
original).
117Id
11s In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 569 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing various decisions
demonstrating this divide).
119 See Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 77, at 332-33; Knapp, supra note 5, at 29; Hirshman,
Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7, at 213-14.
120 Hirshman, Fatall & Spingola, supra note 7, at 213-14.
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test," courts employing the "actual test" do not consider the hypothetical
scenario of assignment when there is no intention of assignment at the time of
assumption.121
2. Poliy Considerations and Objectives. The "actual test" approach has been
criticized as contrary to or a rejection of the plain language of Section 365(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code.122 Proponents of the "actual test" approach, however,
laud its pragmatism.123 Those courts employing the "actual test" stress not only
this pragmatism and focus on the actual intentions of the debtor-licensee, but
also emphasize traditional bankruptcy law values. These courts are specifically
concerned with the survival of the debtor-business where such survival depends
on the ability of the debtor-licensee to continue to use licensed intellectual
property. These courts emphasize:
[T]he fact that a literal interpretation of the disjunctive "or" is
utterly incongruent with the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code and
would lead to the anomalous result that a debtor in possession
would be deprived of its valuable but unassignable contract solely
by reason of having sought the protection of the Bankruptcy Court,
even though it did not intend to assign it.124
3. Application: Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp. In Institut Pasteur
v. Cambridge Biotech Cop., Cambridge Biotech Corporation (CBC) manufactured
and sold diagnostic testing kits to detect the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV).125 To accomplish this work CBC entered into various cross-license
agreements in 1989 with Pasteur Sanofi Diagnostics (Pasteur), which held the
exclusive right to use and sublicense patents of the Institut Pasteur, a nonprofit
foundation engaged in AIDS-related research and development that held
several patents for procedures to diagnose a particular type of the HIV virus,
HIV-2.126 Under these cross-licenses, CBC acquired the right to use these
patented diagnostic procedures in diagnostic kits it developed and sold in
several countries, including the United States.127 In exchange, Pasteur acquired
the right to use various technologies patented or licensed by CBC.128 Though
the cross-license agreements specifically barred either party from assigning or
sublicensing these rights to third parties, both CBC and Pasteur retained the
121 Id. at 214.

122Knapp, supra note 5, at 29; Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 77, at 332-33. See, e.g.,
Pearlman v. Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 754 (9th Cir. 1999)
(asserting that an actual test approach amounts to a judicial revision of Section 365(c)).
123 Knapp, sapra note 5, at 29; Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 77, at 332-33.
124 In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 570 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
125 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997).
126 Id. at 490.
127

Id

128

Id
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benefits of the license agreements to "affiliated companies," defined as
"organization[s] which [control] or [are] controlled by a party or an organization
which is under common control with a party." 29
While still holding these cross-licenses, CBC filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 in 1994, and continued, as debtor-in-possession, to operate its
business.1 30 In the process of its reorganization, CBC sought to assume the
cross-licenses it held with Pasteur and continue in the manufacturing and selling
of retroviral tests.131 CBC also proposed in its reorganization plan to sell all
32
CBC stock to a subsidiary of bioMerieux, a competitor of Pasteur.1 Pasteur
objected to the reorganization plan, arguing that such assumption of the crosslicenses by CBC and de facto assignment to a third party, bioMerieux, would
violate not only the explicit terms of the cross-licenses with respect to
assignability, but also the presumption of nonassignability of patents in federal
common law.133 Pasteur asserted that it would not extend such a license, under
the terms provided by CBC, to its direct competitor. 34
The bankruptcy court, over the objections of Pasteur, permitted CBC to
assume the cross-licenses as part of its reorganization plan, holding that such a
sale to bioMerieux did not constitute an assignment, but rather an assumption
of the license by the debtor-in-possession under new ownership, as permitted
by Section 365(c).1 35 The First Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed
36
this decision of the bankruptcy court.1
Following its previous rejection of the "hypothetical test,"1'3 the court
employed the "actual test" (which it refers to as the "actual performance
test"138) to determine whether Pasteur was actually being denied the full benefit
of its bargain with the debtor-licensee. The Court articulated the test as
follows:
Where the particular transaction envisions that the debtor-inpossession would assume and continue to perform under an
executory contract, the bankruptcy court cannot simply presume as
a matter of the law that the debtor-in-possession is a legal entity
matenally distinct from the prepetition debtor with whom the
nondebtor party ... contracted. Rather, "sensitive to the rights of
Id
Id
131 Id.
132 Id
129
130

133 Id at 490-91.
134

Id.

135 Id.at 491.
136 Id. at 489.

137 Id. at 493, referring to its decision in Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux (In re Leroux), 69
F.3d 608 (1st Cir. 1995).
138 Id
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the nondebtor party. . ." the bankruptcy court must focus on the
performance actually to be rendered by the debtor-in-possession
with a view to ensuring that the nondebtor party ... will receive the
"full benefit of [its] bargain."' 39
With its focus on the actual intentions of the debtor-licensee with respect to
assignment, the court held that CBC was permitted to assume the cross-licenses
at issue in bankruptcy, despite the objections of licensor Institut Pasteur.
4. Application: In re Footstar, Inc. In 2005, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York, while not determining the fate of
an intellectual property license in bankruptcy, articulated more fully the policy
concerns underlying this issue of assumption and assignment of licenses as
executory contracts in bankruptcy.140 More importantly, the Court provided an
alternative interpretation of the language of Section 365(c).141 In In re Footstar,
Inc., the debtor operated both a discount and family footwear business, and an
athletic apparel and footwear business.142 After filing for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11, the debtor-in-possession continued to operate its discount and
family footwear division, known as Meldisco.143 Almost all of the revenue
received by Meldisco came from operation of footwear departments located
inside Kmart retail stores.144 An outside "Shoemart Corporation" operated
shoe departments inside Kmart stores.145 Footstar/Meldisco owned fifty-one
percent of Shoemart Corporation, while Kmart owned the remaining forty-nine
percent.146 Under sub-agreements with Kmart, Shoemart Corporation, and thus
Footstar/Meldisco, held the exclusive right to operate the shoe departments in
over 1,500 Kmart stores.147 In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Footstar sought to
assume these licenses.148
The Court permitted the debtor to assume the licenses in bankruptcy,
asserting that "nothing in the Bankruptcy Code" would prohibit such an
assumption.149 Here, the Court declared its preference for the practical results
of the application of the "actual test" as opposed to the "hypothetical test" in
determining whether an executory contract may be assumed by a debtor, 50 and

139 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528, 612-13 (1984) (emphasis in
original)).
140 In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
141
142

Id
Id

143 Id. at 568.
144 Id. at 566.
145
146
147

Id
Id
Id

148 Id. at 568.
149 Id. at 570.
150 Id.
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also put forth a "somewhat different focus for analysis of Section 365."151 The
Court asserts that the plain language of Section 365(c) is intended to apply only
to the trustee in a bankruptcy estate, should one be appointed, and not to the
debtor-in-possession. To read the statute otherwise, according to the Court,
would be to "defy the 'plain meaning' of the statute as written by Congress"1 52
and would result in the same sort of "judicial legislation" feared by proponents
of the hypothetical test.153 The Court notes that Congress "has been quite
careful" in discriminating between a trustee and a debtor-in-possession.154
When this distinction is appreciated, the Court asserts that any concern that a
licensor may be forced to accept performance from a third-party is not relevant
where a debtor-in-possession assumes an executory contract. 55 When a trustee
is appointed to a Chapter 11 estate, the debtor ceases to be a debtor-inpossession and the trustee assumes all the rights and property of the estate.156
In this situation, then, the Court states that "it makes perfect sense to say that
the trustee may not assume the contract, and also that the trustee may not
assign it,"s? for this would oblige the licensor to accept performance from a
party with which it did not contract. When the debtor-in-possession, however,
assumes the license, this does not force the licensor to accept performance
The Court states, "the basic objective of
from a third party. 58
Section 365(c)(1)-to protect the contract counterparty [licensor] - from
unlawful assignment of the contract-simply is not implicated when a debtor in
possession itself seeks to assume, but not assign, the contract." 59
In providing this analysis, the Court notes that the "hypothetical test" may
yield the "perverse and anomalous consequence" of the debtor losing a nonassignable contract-a contract it was once a party to-in bankruptcy when
Thus, in holding that
that contract is critical to its survival.160
Footstar/Meldisco was not prohibited from assuming its contract with Kmart
as a debtor-in-possession, the Court not only rejects the "hypothetical test" for
its consequences that are contrary to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code,161
but also seriously calls into question a reading of Section 365(c) that applies to
both a trustee and a debtor-in-possession. In doing so, the decision in In re
Footstar, subsequently followed in both the Second 62 and Tenth' 63 Circuit

151 Id.
152

Id

153 Id. at 570-71.
'54 Id. at 571.
156
157

Id. at 573.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 573.

158

Id

159

Id at 573-74.
Id. at 574.
Id.
In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 359 B.R. 65 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).

155

160
161

162

-
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Bankruptcy Courts, has ushered in some hope for resolution of the persistent
question of whether a non-exclusive license may be assumed in bankruptcy by a
debtor-licensee.164
H. N.CP. MARKETING GROUP,INC V. BG STAR PRODUCTIONS

In March 2009, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in N.CP.
Marketing Group, Inc. v. BG Star Productions (NCP Markeing)165 to the
disappointment of many engaged in both intellectual property and bankruptcy
law.166 In denying certiorari, the Court left unresolved the split among circuits
regarding the treatment of non-exclusive intellectual property licenses in
bankruptcy. Despite the Court's denial of certiorari, NCP. Marketing may well
come to mark a significant point in the resolution of the circuit split. In
"reluctantly" agreeing to deny certiorari, Justice Kennedy, together with Justice
Breyer, submitted a statement urging the Court to consider granting certiorari in
a different, future case in order to resolve the "significant question" of how
courts are to interpret the meaning of Section 365(c)(1).1 67
N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc. (NCP) held a non-exclusive license to
advertise and sell fitness-related products and services containing the "TaeBo"
trademark, owned by Billy and Gayle Blanks through BG Star Productions
(BG).168 The relationship between the parties was governed by a Settlement
Agreement confirming the Blanks' ownership of the trademark, signed in
October 2001, and a License Agreement, signed in June 2002, establishing the
parameters for how N.C.P. was to use the trademark.169 Shortly after the
signing of these agreements, N.C.P. materially breached both agreements in its
failure to pay the Blanks agreed-upon royalties.170 In response to the breach, an
arbitrator ordered that N.C.P. pay the Blanks $2.1 million in royalties.' 7' N.C.P.
failed to pay this amount and instead filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in April
2004.172
In the plan for reorganization filed by N.C.P. with respect to its Chapter 11
bankruptcy, the debtor sought to assume the TaeBo license agreement as an

In re Aerobox Composite Structures, 373 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007).
See, e.g., David R. Kuney, Restructuring Dilemmas for the High Technology Licensee: Will 'Plain
Meaning" Bring Orderto the Chaotic Bankrupt LawforAssumption andAssignment of Technolo Licenses?,
44 GONZ. L. REv. 123 (2008-2009).
165 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009).
166 See, e.g., King & Spalding, supra note 12.
167 N.CP. Mktg. Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1578.
168 N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. Blanks (In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group), 337 B.R. 230, 232 (D. Nev.
2005).
169 Id. at 232-33.
170 Id. at 233.
171 Id.
172 Id.
163

164
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executory contract under Section 365(c).1 73 The Blanks resisted such an
assumption, asserting first that the debtor no longer owned the license right,
and thus had no right to assume the license as all controlling agreements had
been terminated for breach of contract.174 The Blanks further asserted that,
even if the debtor did own such rights, the license was non-assumable under
applicable federal trademark law. 75 In affirming the decision of the Bankruptcy
Court, the United States District Court in the District of Nevada found this
second argument particularly compelling. The court concluded that applicable
federal trademark law provides that "trademarks are personal and nonassignable without the consent of the licensor" 7 6 and, under the "hypothetical
test" adopted in the Ninth Circuit, a debtor-in-possession may not assume such
an executory contract in the face of licensor objections if such applicable law
would bar assignment of such a license to a third party, even if the debtorlicensor has no intention of such assignment.17 7 The court thus held that
N.C.P. could not assume the license in bankruptcy without the consent of the
Blanks.178 This decision was subsequently affirmed without argument by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.'79
Though the Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case, Justice Kennedy's
statement urging the Court to consider granting certiorari in a different case
indicates that the issue of interpreting Section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code is
"an important one to resolve for Bankruptcy Courts and for businesses that
seek reorganization" 8 0 to at least some members of the sitting Court. Justice
Kennedy notes that such an effort to address this issue may first require the
resolution of "antecedent questions under state law and trademark-protection
principles," though he does not specifically articulate those underlying issues.' 8'
III. DIscussIoN
A. CONSEQUENCES OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

With the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in NCP. Marketing Group, Inc.
v. BG Star Productions, the split among circuits regarding the interpretation of
Section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code remains intact. In the majority of
circuits, the "hypothetical test" has been adopted and intellectual property

Id
Id
'75 Id
176 Id at 237.
177 Id.at 234-35.
178 Id.at 238.
1' N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. BG Star Prods., Inc. (In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc.), 279 Fed.
'3

174

Appx. 561 (9th Cir. 2008).
"so

N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1578 (2009).

181 Id
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licensors may generally expect to obtain the power to deny the efforts of a
debtor-licensee in Chapter 11 bankruptcy to both assume and assign nonexclusive intellectual property licenses. In the minority of circuits where the
"actual test" has been adopted, the licensor may, alternatively, expect a case-bycase analysis to determine the actual intention of the debtor-licensee with
respect to assignment and for the debtor-in-possession to be permitted to
assume an intellectual property license where that debtor does not intend to
assign that license to a third party.
The jurisdiction where the bankruptcy is filed, thus, plays a central
determinative role in the disposition of an intellectual property license in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. While this determinative power of jurisdiction is
present in any circuit split scenario, this problem is especially exacerbated in the
bankruptcy context, where the debtor has greater control over the jurisdiction
in which its case is filed. A Chapter 11 bankruptcy case may be commenced by
a business in the district court for the district that is either (1) the principal place
of its business, (2) the principal location of its assets, or (3) the place of its
incorporation.182 For many businesses, this restricts venue options to one or
two jurisdictions. For larger corporations, however, it is easy to imagine a
scenario in which the corporation may have its place of incorporation in one
jurisdiction, its principal place of business in another, and perhaps its principal
assets located in still another.183 This flexibility afforded to the debtor provides
a convenient mechanism for strategic forum-shopping for the debtor-licensee
who wishes to assume a non-exclusive intellectual property license and who has
reason to believe that such an assumption would not be consented to by the
licensor. With such opportunity available to many debtor-licensees, the licensor
of intellectual property is disadvantaged in not being able to reliably predict
how its license will be treated should the licensee enter bankruptcy. Inherent in
such uncertainty are concerns about differential protection and rights for both
the licensor and the debtor-licensee. Where a debtor-licensee enjoys the
freedom to select from multiple venues and where one jurisdiction may be
more advantageous in terms of assumption of a license agreement, the debtor is
necessarily afforded greater protections than other debtors who are not similarly
situated. In the converse, where the bankruptcy case is filed in a jurisdiction
more favorable to the licensor in its use of the hypothetical test, the licensor
enjoys more rights than other licensors of intellectual property.
Beyond these equity concerns, the uncertainty resulting from the circuit split
may increase legal costs to both the licensor and the licensee. In anticipating
the potential of bankruptcy and guarding against the effects of the circuit split,
contracts may require more time to develop and execute between parties. If an

182 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006).
183 See

BANKRUPTCY:

THE

NEXT TWENTY

YEARS,

NATIONAL

BANKRUPTCY

REVIEW

ColNefssIoN FINAL REPORT § 3.1.5 (2009).
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issue does arise with respect to a license agreement in bankruptcy, the legal
costs associated with navigating the uncertain waters and pursuing the case
appropriately may also increase costs to the parties.
Finally, the circuit split may make investors more wary of investing in a
business whose success largely depends on holding certain intellectual property
licenses if there is a possibility that such licenses may not be assumed in
reorganization should the licensee file Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The uncertainty
of the disposition of the licenses may not only discourage investment generally,
but, where the risk is taken by the investor, may yield an investment which is
less favorable to the licensee than would have occurred if the investor had not
had to guard against the risk of such uncertainty.
B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

1. Bankrupty Law. Bankruptcy protection is available to individuals and
businesses in the United States in the spirit of providing a second chance to
realize financial stability and success.'1 Chapter 11 bankruptcy, in particular, is
designed deliberately with the intention of providing a debtor business the
opportunity to reorganize itself to achieve economic stability both at the
organizational level and, more broadly, as an actor in the overall commercial
activities of the larger economy.185 Significant tools toward this end include the
automatic stay provisions' 86 and the ability, as debtor in possession, to assume
or reject executor contracts and unexpired leases of the debtor.187
Bankruptcy law is not, by any means, concerned only with the rights of the
debtor. To the contrary, bankruptcy law embodies an attempt to balance the
interests of the debtor with those of the creator.'88 Toward this end, creators,
among other things, vote to confirm a debtor's Chapter 11 reorganization
plan,'89 may be able to dismiss a plan filed in bad faith or a plan that is not
feasible,190 and may seek relief from the automatic stay when their interests are
not adequately protected.''
18 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934) (articulating that the purpose of the
bankruptcy act is to give "the honest but unfortunate debtor ... a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort").
185Johns-Manville Corp. v. Chubb Indem. Ins. Co. (In re Johns-Manville), 517 F.3d 52 (2d Cir.
2008) (noting that the purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcy is achieved in "facilitating the
reorganization and rehabilitation of the debtor as an economically viable entity"); NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (finding "the fundamental purpose of
reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs
and possible misuse of economic resources').
.186 11 U.S.C. 5 362 (2006).
18 Id. § 365.
18s 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1100.01 (15th ed. 2004).
189 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006).
190 Id § 1112(b).
191 Id. § 362(d).
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2. IntellectualProperty Law. Intellectual property law, too, is concerned with
economic success, particularly as realized through the provision of-or, at a
minimum, the protection of-incentives for creation and invention.192 Toward
this end, intellectual property licensors retain significant rights to protect their
property in the manner in which it is used, and from assignment to third parties.
In a broader sense, this concern for incentivizing creation and invention is, like
those principles underlying bankruptcy law, a concern for greater economic
stability, not only for the intellectual property license-holder, but also for the
broader commercial environment.
C. COMMON GROUND AS REALIZED THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF THE
ACTUAL TEST

Bankruptcy law and intellectual property law share more common policy
objectives than they do competing objectives. Most notably, both bodies of law

are distinctly concerned with maximizing individual potential for economic
success. Where intellectual property law allows for the commercialization and
protection of the tangible expressions of our ideas and our creativity,
bankruptcy law provides us the opportunity to reorganize the business
surrounding that commercialization should the need arise. The common
ground underlying both intellectual property law and bankruptcy law is this
Where
value of protecting and expanding commercial opportunities.
intellectual property law addresses this concern for opportunity in its effort to
diminish unfair competition,193 bankruptcy law addresses the same concern in
its effort to provide a fresh start.194 Both of these efforts recognize that "the
good will and other property of a business should be protected."s9 5 Far from
undermining this common ground, use of the "actual test" to determine
whether a debtor-licensee of intellectual property may, in Chapter 11
bankruptcy, assume a license it held pre-petition affirms this common interest
in opportunity for commercial success.
It is readily apparent how permitting a debtor-licensee to assume such an
intellectual property license in bankruptcy when the debtor has not
contemplated the assignment of the license comports with the underlying
purpose and principles of bankruptcy law. When a debtor-licensee relies on
such a license for the survival of its business, to deny such assumption would
be to frustrate the reorganization and opportunity for economic success of the
debtor-in-possession.
Arguably, the benefit of such a scheme to the non-consenting licensor is a
harder sell. Despite the licensor's reasonable frustrations related to being in a

192

See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

193 1-1 GILSON ON TRADEMARK

1.04.

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
195 1-1 GILSON ON TRADEMARK$ 1.04[2].
194
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licensing relationship with an insolvent licensee, however, it is important to
realize that this issue of assumption does not unfairly disadvantage the nondebtor licensor. That is, while it may not be preferable to the licensor, this
assumption does not take any right from the licensor that it would have
otherwise enjoyed had the licensee not filed for bankruptcy protection. From
the licensor's perspective, the assumption of an intellectual property license by a
debtor-licensee in bankruptcy does not change the bargain that the parties
agreed to, nor the terms they were bound by pre-petition. With assumption,
both the licensor and the licensee continue to receive the benefit of their prepetition bargain. In so doing, intellectual property law's interest in the
protection and expansion of economic opportunity-the "common ground"is only furthered.
The true risk of the "hypothetical test" lies in barring the assumption of the
license, bestowing upon the licensor rights that it would not otherwise have
had. The ironic and tragic consequence of such a bar would be that the debtor
that sought protection in bankruptcy was instead denied a right it held prepetition (the right to its non-assignable license, a right necessary to its survival),
while the licensor's rights were expanded beyond what they were pre-petition.
The potential that filing for bankruptcy harms the debtor, while the licensor
receives a virtual boon of rights, undermines the purpose of and policies
underlying bankruptcy law to an intolerable extent. In contrast, what is asked
of the non-debtor licensor is little more than what it bargained for pre-petition.
While the position of the non-debtor licensor is not an enviable one, it should
not be an unanticipated one, particularly in the current economic climate.
Pragmatically, the non-debtor licensor may find that it, in fact, prefers to deal
with a licensee who is working through a monitored and highly-structured plan
for reorganization through the bankruptcy system than it would an insolvent
and floundering licensee. For these reasons, the "actual test" to determine
whether an intellectual property license may be assumed in Chapter 11
bankruptcy, unlike the "hypothetical test," furthers, or at the very least does not
undermine, the policy concerns underlying both bankruptcy and intellectual
property law.
IV. CONCLUSION

The "actual test" for determining whether an intellectual property license
may be assumed in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, even when the licensor does not
offer its consent for assumption, offers a pragmatic, reasoned approach to this
issue that not only comports with the plain meaning of Section 365(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code, but also does not undermine the underlying policy concerns
of either bankruptcy or intellectual property law. Indeed, what does frustrate the
underlying policies of both bankruptcy and intellectual property law is the
confusion, inconsistency, inequity, and resulting increased costs resulting from
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the circuit split on this issue. For this reason, the United States Supreme Court
should grant certiorari when the proper case arises, per Justice Kennedy and
Justice Breyer, to resolve this issue and should do so by adopting the "actual
test" to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether an intellectual property
license may be assumed in Chapter 11 bankruptcy by a debtor-licensee, even
over the objections of the non-debtor licensor.
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